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The economic benefits of remittances - A case study from 
Poland 
Remittances are flows of money between individuals living in different countries, most typically a 
foreign worker sending money back to his or her home country.  In the last few years remittances 
have risen significantly throughout the world as a result of increased migration flows, as well as 
reduced sending costs. Remittance flows to developing countries now account for a large portion of 
external capital inflows—well ahead of official development assistance. In many smaller economies, 
large-scale remittance flows account for more than a quarter of GDP. 
 
Macroeconomic Effects of Remittances in Poland. Remittances have risen significantly in Poland 
over the last twenty years, and now amount to a noticeable share of the balance of payments and 
the economy.  At over US$8 billion in 2011, they placed Poland as the 17th largest recipient of 
remittances. Remittances grew from 0.5 to 1.5 percent of GDP in the period 1995-2011, with a peak 
of 2.5 percent of GDP in 2006-2007. The value and share of remittances in GDP increased 
considerably after the Polish accession to the EU and the opportunity for the Poles in most European 
labour markets. Remittances were also larger than EU transfers until 2008.  
 
In this study we show, through the use of a macro-econometric model, that as a result of the 
remittances inflow and its effect on consumption and incomes, the GDP of Poland in 2011 was at 
least PLN 22 billion (US$7b) higher than it would have been in the absence of the transfers.  Other 
intangibles, such as the contribution to financial sector deepening, are more difficult to quantify, but 
are clearly positive. 
 
Effects of Remittances on Household Budgets in Poland. How important are remittances in the 
budgets of Polish families? Which families are the primary beneficiaries? Does the inflow of income 
from abroad reduce poverty and inequality, and to what extent?  To address these questions, this 
study used data from the 2008 Household Budget Survey, which identifies all sources of foreign 
income to Polish individuals.  The main results can be summarized as follows: 
• Remittances involve a relatively small number of households in Poland, (2.5 per cent or 
about 330,000 households, amounting to over 1.2 million people).  But because remittances 
are concentrated within a small number of households, they actually represent a sizeable 
portion of the incomes of their members (on average, 62 per cent of income for households 
receiving remittances). 
• Recipients of remittances hail mostly from small towns and rural areas rather than large 
cities; they tend to live in areas located in the parts of the country which have experienced a 
large outflow of migration.  In addition, they are often from large households (especially 
young families with children), and their educational levels reach basic vocational education 
or higher (rather than primary education). 
• Because of their concentration and importance among recipients, remittances have a 
powerful effect with regard to the overall poverty rate, as they reduce it by nearly two 
percentage points.  They also result in a slight decrease in income disparities. 
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In conclusion, in this study we show that remittances have increased GDP growth for Poland and, 
most importantly, have contributed to increased welfare for some of the least well-to-do segments 
of the Polish population.  A lesson of the study is that, while in the short-run the current economic 
slow-down in Europe may result in reduced opportunities for Polish workers interested in 
employment abroad, it would be nevertheless important to keep the facilitation of remittances 
(costs, financial instruments, financial literacy) on the policy agenda in order to extend their 
contribution to the national economy in the years to come. 
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Remittances: a vital economic function 
 
In countries such as Poland, where labour migration has become a major feature of socio-economic 
life, international remittances have assumed a new significance. 
 
Made up of low-value, person-to-person payments, the aggregate value of these international 
remittances has escalated in recent years.  On a global basis, it exceeds the value of official 
development assistance (and has done so for more than 15 years).  And, for many emerging 
countries, it also exceeds the value of foreign direct investment, private debt flows and portfolio 
equity flows. 
 
Given this scale, international remittances perform a valuable and often overlooked economic 
function for a migrant’s home country: 
 
• At the macroeconomic level, they contribute to GDP growth and consumption 
 
• At the household level, they alleviate poverty and supplement incomes 
 
Within this paper, we seek to quantify the actual impact.  Our focus is Poland.  But our broader 
conclusions should hold true for any country with a similar scale of labour migration. 
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Remittances – our definition 
 
The term ‘remittance’ is used widely but somewhat imprecisely.   
 
Within this document, we have adopted a narrow definition of the term, as set out by the United 
Nations Statistics Division.  
 
The unit under consideration is the migrant (including also short-term migrant), independent 
of their status (e.g. employed or not, legal or illegal, etc.).  The aim is to capture the net 
receivable of transactions, without quid pro quo, between the migrant and the related 
household in the home country, independently from the source of income (be it wages and 
salaries, social benefits or any other current transfer) and the use this money is put to in the 
home country (e.g. alimony, inheritance, lottery, etc.)
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By using this narrow definition, we are better able to focus on the economic impact of migration on 
the migrant’s home economy.   
 
 
  
                                                            
1 As explained in the 2005 Issue Paper: Definition of Remittances and Relevant Bpm5 Flows, Alessandra Alfieri, Ivo Havinga and Vetle 
Hvidsten 
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Remittances and the global economy 
 
The value of international remittances has increased significantly in recent years.   
 
They now account for a substantial proportion of resource flows towards most developing 
economies – so much so that they are generally regarded as the ‘third pillar’ of development 
(alongside foreign direct investment and overseas development assistance). 
 
Even during the current global economic climate, the value of remittances continues to grow.  
Indeed, the World Bank reports that, in 2011, total remittances to developing countries amounted 
to some US$372 billion – representing an annual increase of 12 per cent (Fig. 1).  
 
 
 
Remittances (which, it should be stressed, are made up entirely of person-to-person payment flows) 
surpassed total Overseas Development Assistance as far back as 1997, and are now greater than 
private debt and portfolio equity flows to developing countries. 
 
The substantial growth in remittances can be attributed to a variety of factors – including the 
acceleration of labour migration within several specific migration “corridors”, and the progressive 
improvement in real wages paid to migrants in many parts of the world. 
 
Remittances are, of course, voluntary money transfers paid between private individuals.  As such the 
funds can then be used solely according to the wishes of the individuals involved.   
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Several studies involving a number of different countries have investigated the use of remittances by 
their recipients.  The general consensus is that, by augmenting households incomes (often in 
disadvantaged situations), remittances can:  
 
• Contribute to poverty reduction 
• Represent an investment in human capital (such as education and health care) 
• Foster the establishment of micro businesses (albeit in more limited circumstances)   
 
Investment in residential housing by migrants is one of the most widely-documented uses of 
remittances (and also in personal savings by migrants returning to their home country). 
 
Until the crisis of 2008-2009, it had been thought that remittances were less prone to cyclical 
fluctuations than other flows of resources towards developing countries.  This opinion was backed 
up by evidence that migrants from a shrinking economy may actually increase their remittances out 
of solidarity with family recipients – thereby helping their home country to cushion the true impact 
of the recession.  
 
However, the unprecedented nature of the latest financial crisis did result in an unusual and 
temporary dip in overall remittance values during 2009.  This was because the crisis simultaneously 
struck many sending and receiving countries.  It also had a disproportionate impact on sectors such 
as construction and travel (which, of course, are traditional occupations for many migrants).  
 
At the time, these dips in remittances are thought to have worsened the magnitude of the recession 
in certain countries.  However, as indicated in Fig. 1, growth in global remittance values returned 
quickly – and flows are forecast to continue increasing for the foreseeable future. 
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Looking at the absolute scale of inward remittance flows (see Fig. 2), China and India emerge as the 
clear world leaders.  Poland is also among the top 20 countries, just ahead of Italy. 
 
 
 
When one looks at these flows as a percentage of GDP (Fig. 3), the picture is very different.  Under 
this measure, the top 20 countries can all be regarded as low-income developing countries, many of 
which can be thought of as “migration dependent”. 
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Remittances in Poland – the macroeconomic perspective 
 
Over recent years, labour migration has become an important factor of Poland’s socio-economic life, 
but understanding the true impact of the resulting remittances is a complex undertaking.   Within 
this section of the paper, we consider the role they play in Poland’s economy and, more particularly, 
the size and nature of consumer spending and the contribution towards economic growth.  
 
Types of transfers and data sources 
 
Data on remittances to Poland have only been compiled and reported by Poland’s Central Bank (the 
National Bank of Poland, NBP) since 2001. This data comprises two distinct categories of income 
which is accrued abroad by migrant workers and is reported as two separate current account items 
under Poland’s Balance of Payments: 
 
• Current incomes 
For migrant workers who have been employed overseas for less than one year – their total 
compensation is reported as current incomes. 
 
• Current transfers 
For migrant workers who have been employed overseas for more than one year – the transfers 
(or remittances) they make to Poland (representing a portion of their compensation) are 
considered as private value transfers and are reported as current transfers.   
 
This category includes the incomes of individuals whose major economic interests remain 
focused in their country of employment. 
 
The Central Bank bases its reports on the payment flows that are officially documented by the 
banking system together with its own estimates. In making its estimates (for example, on the 
number of Poles working overseas, their respective employment periods, income levels and 
propensity to send monies back home) the Central Bank takes the following factors into account: 
 
• Emigration data reported by the Central Statistical Office (GUS)  
• The so called BAEL2 survey results on projected emigration flows  
• Official (social insurance) data from those countries where Polish migrant workers are employed 
• The findings from a one-off survey, conducted by the Central Bank in 2007, on the population of 
Poles working in Great Britain and Ireland 
• Reports by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (MPiPS) on the availability of jobs offered to 
Polish workers in Germany 
• The official EUROSTAT figures 
 
                                                            
2 BAEL – quarterly survey on the Population’s Economic Activity Levels  (Kwartalne Badanie Aktywności Ekonomicznej Ludności) 
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Separate estimates are made for Great Britain, Ireland and Germany (as the most important 
migration destinations for Poles), whereas all other countries are considered together under a single 
category. 
 
All of the remittances made by the longer-term migrants are reported as actual amounts sent to 
Poland (that is, after taxes and the living expenses they incur overseas).  By contrast, the entire gross 
compensation received by the shorter-term migrants is reported. 
 
All income taxes collected by foreign governments are shown as expenditures, but not separated 
from other items, thus making it impossible to assess their magnitude. Remittances are also subject 
to other statistical anomalies.  For example, compensation received by short-term or seasonal cross-
border workers tends to be measured in full, even though some of these monies will be spent 
overseas to cover their living costs. In the balance of payments such expenditures are presented as 
expenses related to foreign trips.  But, unlike taxes, they are impossible to separate from other 
foreign trip costs. As a consequence, inward foreign transfers to Poland may be slightly over-
reported.      
 
As of 2004, the Central Bank has reported income taxes on compensation paid to short-term 
workers.  It has also reported their spending overseas.  This reporting provides a basis for 
extrapolation to such values in previous years (that is, from 1995- 2003). 
 
Estimates for foreign money transfers to various recipient countries are also reported by the World 
Bank3. For Poland, these World Bank estimates (shown as contributions to GDP) were reported for 
the period of 1994-2010. In fact, the values reported for concurrent periods by both the World Bank 
and the Central Bank of Poland (that is, from 2000- 2010) are relatively convergent. In order to 
extend the series presented by the Central Bank right back to 1994, we have therefore made use of 
the World Bank data.  We have also reported transfers as a percentage of GDP drawing on GDP 
reports developed by Poland’s Statistical Office (GUS). 
 
 
Quantifying the value of remittances  
 
As of 1995, the value of overseas money transfers to Poland stood at some PLN 1.7 billion.  By 2007, 
the figure had risen strongly and steadily to exceed PLN 28.8 billion.  Then, by 2011, it had dropped 
back down to around PLN 22.5 billion. 
 
Taking a historical perspective, the changes can probably be ascribed to two main events: 
 
• Poland’s accession to the European Union (EU) in 2004 coincided with a near-doubling of the 
value of remittances  in a single year (from less than PLN 9 billion in 2003 to almost PLN 17 
billion in 2004), followed by continued increases. 
 
                                                            
3http://search.worldbank.org/quickview?name=Workers%27+%3Cem%3Eremittances%3C%2Fem%3E+and+compensation+of+employees
%2C+received+%28%25+of+GDP%29&id=BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS&type=Indicators&cube_no=2&qterm=remittances 
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• The global economic crisis of 2008/2009 resulted—in Poland as well as in the rest of the World—
in a sharp decrease in remittance flows (from the peak of almost PLN 29 billion in 2007 to less 
than PLN 25 billion in 2008), followed by a more gradual downward trend.  One can safely 
surmise that a deterioration in working conditions across the EU member states was the main 
determinant of the reduction in the income generation capacity of Poles overseas.  
 
Measured as a  proportion of GDP, transfers stood at just 0.5 per cent in 1995.  They then grew five-
fold to reach a peak of 2.5 per cent of GDP in 2006.  The subsequent shrinking of remittances, at a 
time of rapid GDP growth within Poland, then saw the figure fall right back to 1.5 per cent in 2011. 
 
Figure 4.  Foreign money transfers to Poland as reported in the Balance of Payments (1995-2011) 
 Balance of Payments 
 Total transfers   
    Remittances of 
compensations by long 
term workers  
Real/(actual) flows 
Compensations of short 
term workers  
Total (pre tax) gross values 
 PLN 
million 
GDP  
%  
disposable 
income  
%  
PLN million PLN million 
1995 1 686 0,5 0,7 647 1 039 
1996 2 112 0,5 0,7 811 1 301 
1997 2 577 0,5 0,7 989 1 588 
1998 3 605 0,6 0,8 1 384 2 222 
1999 3 328 0,5 0,7 1 278 2 051 
2000 6 529 0,9 1,2 2 506 4 023 
2001 6 408 0,8 1,1 2 436 3 972 
2002 7 015 0,9 1,2 2 565 4 450 
2003 8 881 1,1 1,5 2 882 5 999 
2004 17 184 1,9 2,7 4 074 13 110 
2005 21 037 2,1 3,2 5 911 15 126 
2006 26 269 2,5 3,8 9 140 17 129 
2007 28 821 2,4 3,9 11 696 17 125 
2008 24 752 1,9 3,1 11 213 13 539 
2009 25 051 1,9 2,9 11 393 13 658 
2010 22 906 1,6 2,5 10 887 12 019 
2011 22 517 1,5 2,4 10 889 11 628 
Sources:  
1) Total transfers, remittances of compensations of workers between 2000 and 2011- The Central Bank’s 
(NBP)Balance of Payments for 2000-2011;  
2) Total transfers as a percentage of GDP and disposable income in 2000 to 2011 – proprietary 
computations based on reports by the Central Statistical Office (GUS)  (national accounts);  
3) Total transfers as a percentage of GDP between 1995 and 1999 – reported by  the World Bank;  
4) Total transfers between 1995 and 1999 – proprietary computations based on GDP reports by the 
World Bank and GUS;  
5) Remittances of workers’ compensation between 1995-1999 – proprietary extrapolations inferred from 
values reported for 2000 to 2011. 
 
It is helpful to harmonise the two categories of pay that are received by workers overseas and then 
transferred to Poland.  To do so, we made use of the Central Bank’s detailed estimates of the income 
tax paid by short-term workers on the wages they received and the expenses they incurred 
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overseas. Given that the share of taxes and expenses remained relatively stable from 2004- 2011, we 
assumed that similar proportions would be correct for 1995- 2003. The short-term workers’ earnings 
(as reported in the Balance of Payments) were then reduced by the estimated tax and expenditure 
amounts, thus revealing the real/actual values of transfers.  
 
Having applied this methodology, the resulting total of the real/actual inflows turned out to be as 
much as a third lower than the values reported in the Balance of Payments. In 1995, the figure stood 
at PLN 1.2 billion (representing 0.3 per cent of GDP), reaching a height of PLN 20.1 billion in 2007 
(1.7 per cent of GDP), before falling down to PLN 17.0 billion in 2011 (1.1 % of GDP).   
 
During the boom years, it is estimated that these real inflows accounted for some 2.7 per cent of 
disposable household incomes, subsequently falling to around 1.8 per cent in 2011.  
 
Figure 5. Foreign transfer inflows to Poland – real/actual flows (1995-2011) 
 ESTIMATED REAL/ACTUAL VALUEs TRANSFERRED 
 Total transfers      
    Remittances of 
compensation 
by long term 
workers 
real/actual 
flows 
Compensations 
of short term 
workers  
real/actual  
flows 
Compensations 
of short term 
workers  
pre tax/ gross 
values 
Income tax 
on 
compensati
ons payable 
by short 
term 
workers  
Expenditure 
by short 
term 
workers 
while 
overseas 
 
PLN 
million 
GDP 
%  
 disposable 
income 
% o 
PLN million PLN million PLN million  PLN million  PLN million 
1995 1 156 0,3 0,5 647 509 1 039 -147 -383 
1996 1 448 0,3 0,5 811 638 1 301 -184 -480 
1997 1 767 0,3 0,5 989 778 1 588 -224 -586 
1998 2 472 0,4 0,6 1 384 1 088 2 222 -313 -820 
1999 2 282 0,3 0,5 1 278 1 005 2 051 -289 -757 
2000 4 477 0,6 0,8 2 506 1 971 4 023 -567 -1485 
2001 4 382 0,6 0,8 2 436 1 946 3 972 -560 -1466 
2002 4 745 0,6 0,8 2 565 2 180 4 450 -628 -1643 
2003 5 821 0,7 1,0 2 882 2 939 5 999 -846 -2214 
2004 10 496 1,1 1,7 4 074 6 422 13 110 -1849 -4839 
2005 13 332 1,4 2,0 5 911 7 421 15 126 -2128 -5578 
2006 17 560 1,7 2,5 9 140 8 420 17 129 -2402 -6308 
2007 20 107 1,7 2,7 11 696 8 411 17 125 -2405 -6310 
2008 17 973 1,4 2,2 11 213 6 760 13 539 -1956 -4823 
2009 18 397 1,4 2,1 11 393 7 004 13 658 -1991 -4663 
2010 17 006 1,2 1,9 10 887 6 119 12 019 -1791 -4109 
2011 17 026 1,1 1,8 10 889 6 137 11 628 -1708 -3784 
 
Sources:  
1) Total transfers, remittances of workers’ compensation between 2000 and 2011- The Central Bank’s 
(NBP) Balance of Payments for 2000-2011;  
2) Total transfers as a per centage of GDP and disposable income in 2000 to 2011 – proprietary 
computations based on reports by the Central Statistical Office (GUS)  (national accounts);  
3) Total transfers as a per centage of GDP between 1995 and 1999 – reported by  the World Bank;  
4) Total transfers between 1995 and 1999 – proprietary computations based on GDP reports by the 
World Bank and GUS;  
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5) Remittances of workers’ compensation between 1995-1999 – proprietary extrapolations inferred from 
values reported for 2000 to 2011. 
6) Taxes on compensation paid by short-term workers while overseas, 2004-2011 
7) Taxes on compensation paid by short-term workers while overseas, 1995-2003; proprietary 
extrapolations inferred from values recorded for 2004 - 2011 
 
From these figures, it becomes evident that the value of these private payments significantly 
outweighed considerable value of funds committed to Poland by the EU under its various structural 
and cohesion programmes.  
 
Indeed, during 2005, the value of private remittances was five times greater that the inflow of EU 
funds.  And, during the subsequent few years, they remained considerably higher. 
 
Since the financial crisis, the balance has shifted in the opposite direction – to the extent that, by 
2011, the inflows of EU funds were two times higher than the value of private transfers. 
 
Figure 6. Inward foreign transfers to Poland – real/actual flows vs. EU resources committed under 
the structural and cohesion programmes (2005-2011) 
 Inflows of EU 
funds 
Transfers originated abroad  
Real/actual flows 
 
 
PLN million PLN million 
EU funds 
% 
2005 2 419 13 332 551 
2006 13 131 17 560 134 
2007 14 815 20 107 136 
2008 12 532 17 973 143 
2009 19 265 18 397 95 
2010 33 448 17 006 51 
2011 42 786 17 026 40 
Sources:  
1) EU funds: proprietary computations based on monthly reports by the Ministry for Regional 
Development on the absorption  of funds;  
1) Transfers from overseas presented as actual flows – see sources at the bottom of Figure 5. 
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Identifying the source of remittances 
 
In terms of their source, remittances to Poland are largely concentrated within a few key country 
“corridors” – with transfers from just six countries accounting for 80 per cent of the total inflows. 
 
In the years leading up to the financial crisis, Great Britain was accounting for an ever-growing 
proportion of the total inflows (reaching, in real terms, 25 per cent of total values by 2007).  This, of 
course, followed Poland’s accession to the EU and reflects the growing importance of remittances 
sent home by a sizable cadre of long-term migrant workers.   
 
Likewise, for Ireland, growth in the value of transfers (reaching 23 per cent of the total by 2007) was 
driven by remittances payments from long-term workers who benefited from the then Irish 
economic boom, and staying for more than a year.  
 
By contrast, the diminishing stock of Polish seasonal labour in Germany resulted in a 50 per cent fall 
in real inflows originated from that country (from 40 per cent of the total in 2004 to 19 per cent in 
2007).  Similarly, a 50 per cent decline was recorded for transfers from USA (to seven per cent in 
2007), albeit from a much lower level. In both cases, these falls were largely attributable to a 
shrinking volume of transfers from short-term workers.  
 
Meanwhile the monies inflowing from Italy and the Netherlands were relatively smaller and also 
more stable (accounting for five per cent and four per cent respectively of the total inflows during 
2007). 
 
Figure  7. Foreign transfers by source country (2004-2007, %) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Global 100 100 100 100 
Great Britain 16 20 23 25 
Ireland 8 13 19 23 
Germany 40 34 24 19 
USA 14 9 9 7 
Italy 6 6 5 5 
Netherlands 2 3 3 4 
Others 14 16 18 17 
Source: CASE computations based on Central Bank (NBP) reports (2008) 
 
 
Quantifying the contribution to economic growth 
 
The analytical findings presented in the previous pages could easily give the impression that, from a 
macroeconomic perspective, the impact of remittances has been quite modest in Poland – equating, 
at the very most, to around 2.5 per cent of GDP. 
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It could also be assumed that, since the onset of the global economic crisis, this impact has been 
steadily waning. 
 
In fact we take a different view.  We believe that remittances do have a significant impact on the 
Polish economy.  And, to quantify this impact, we have run a series of simulations using a macro-
economic model know as CASE –Advisors (CASE-Doradcy).   
 
This involved the rigorous modelling of a “POLAND without REMITTANCES” scenario over a set time-
span. 
 
How we modelled the impact of remittances on consumption and GDP  
Under the CASE-Advisors model, consumption is represented as a function of disposable income, 
savings rate and various demographic factors (such as the proportion of citizens aged 60 years and 
above in the total population).  
 
When arriving at its official estimates for the income levels of the Polish population, the Central 
Statistical Office (GUS) takes account of a wide range of variables, such as employee compensation, 
income gained through self-employment, social benefits and a variety of transfers. And, from our 
understanding, all private remittances have already been accounted for in the officially-published 
GUS income estimates. 
  
Looking specifically at disposable income, this is defined as the total of employee compensation, 
social benefits and income from other sources. To simulate our “NO TRANSFERS” scenario, we 
therefore isolated and then eliminated the value of overseas transfers from the so-called “income 
from other sources”. From there, we were able to infer all the variables involved, in order to 
understand the true impact of remittances on personal consumption and GDP during the years from 
1995- 2011. 
 
It should be emphasised that the picture is complex.   
 
For example, remittances contribute to disposable income which, in turn, affects household 
consumption levels. Increased consumption levels can then contribute to GDP, but can also trigger 
imports (which would actually serve to reduce GDP). As a further consequence, both employment 
levels and productivity could be affected which, when combined with price rises, could have an 
impact on inflation. In time, any impact on headcount would affect the payroll, and become an 
added component of disposable income.  Any growth in consumption rates would also affect the 
way in which businesses assess the prospects for continued growth, which would then have an 
impact on their investment behaviour.  
 
The impact on consumption and GDP growth 
Between 1995 and 2011 the Polish economy grew at a moderately high rate of 4.4 per cent per 
annum, which corresponds to an aggregate growth in GDP of 99 per cent (in constant prices). 
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This rate of growth was driven largely by domestic demand and, in particular, by household 
consumption – which saw a yearly increase of 4.2 per cent (at constant prices) over our 17-year time 
span. 
 
During the same period: 
 
• Growth in investment was some 50 per cent higher than household consumption (6.5 per cent 
annually in constant prices).  But, due to its smaller proportion in GDP (21 per cent on average 
for investment, compared to 62 per cent for household consumption), the contribution to 
economic growth was some 50 per cent lower (1.3 percentage points compared to 2.6 
percentage points). 
 
• Government spending grew at an annual average of 3.2 per cent, resulting in an average 0.6 
percentage point contribution to GDP growth. 
 
• Although quite volatile, the balance of trade averaged out at -2.5 per cent of GDP.  This equated 
to a negative average contribution to GDP growth of -0.4 percentage points.  
 
Interestingly, disposable income, when measured as a percentage of GDP, fell from 72 per cent in 
1995 to 62 per cent in 2011.  Despite this marked decrease, household consumption accounted for a 
relatively stable proportion of GDP (from slightly below 60 per cent in 1995, to slightly above 60 per 
cent in 2011, with a temporary rise to 66 per cent during 2002).   
 
The mismatch between growth in disposable income and growth in consumption is indicative of a 
gradual decrease in the household savings rate (which fell from 17 per cent in 1995 to two per cent 
in 2011).  It is also correlated with rising levels of indebtedness (expressed as a negative savings 
rate).  As a consequence, household consumption remained the most stable component of 
economic growth, even during times when the wider economy slowed down.  
 
Against this background, it was interesting to model our “NO TRANSFER” scenario.  We found that, 
over our 17-year time span, the impact of overseas remittances was as follows: 
 
• Total household income was higher  
Without remittances, household income would have been reduced by PLN 177 billion.  The value 
of the remittances themselves equated to PLN 160 billion.  The remaining PLN 17 billion would 
have been the result of slightly lower payroll and social benefits values, partly compensated for 
by diminishing tax inflows (payable on lower taxable incomes) and a small increase in the 
incomes of the self employed (due to a slight growth in the number of self employed individuals 
against the backdrop of falling employment levels).  
 
• Average disposable income grew more quickly 
From 1995- 2011, disposable income grew by 2.9 per cent each year.  If it had not been for the 
remittances, the corresponding figure would have been 2.7 per cent (that is, some seven per 
cent lower) 
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• Average household consumption was higher  
From 1995- 2011, household consumption grew by 4.2 per cent each year.  In our “NO 
TRANSFER” scenario, this would have been held back at 4.1 per cent  
 
• Annual GDP growth was accelerated  
As we have said, average GDP growth over the 17-year period was 4.4 per cent.  Without the 
inflow of remittances, the growth rate would have been 4.3 per cent. 
 
Looking, in general, at the 1995- 2011 time span, we can surmise that the inflow of remittances has 
had a positive, although relatively modest, impact on the overall health of Poland’s economy.  But, if 
we look at the big swings in remittance values during certain years, we can detect a much more 
significant impact. 
 
During the year 2000, for example, the value of remittances saw an 80 per cent increase (in real 
terms), which directly triggered an increase in consumption growth from 2.7 per cent to 3.0 per 
cent.  Similarly, in 2004, when remittance values soared by 90 per cent, the growth in consumption 
was lifted from 4.0 per cent to 4.7 per cent.  By complete contrast, in 2008, when remittances 
slumped by 20 per cent, the growth in consumption fell from 6.2 per cent to 5.7 per cent. 
 
It is also worth considering that our “netted off” transfer inflows would have impacted consumption 
both directly and indirectly (that is, via total disposable incomes and savings rates). This explains why 
growing (or falling) remittance volumes did not affect consumption levels proportionately or 
consistently, year-in-year-out. 
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Figure 8. The simulation findings:  
a comparison between historical data and our “NO TRANSFERS “ scenario, 1995-2011 
 
Disposable incomes Household consumption GDP 
 
Historical 
data 
 
“NO 
TRANSFERS” 
scenario 
Historical 
data 
“NO 
TRANSFERS” 
scenario  
Historical 
data 
“NO 
TRANSFERS” 
scenario  
 
 
Including 
overseas 
transfers  
     
 
Real terms growth (%) Real terms growth (%) Real terms growth (%) 
1995 
       1996 4,7 4,5 4,7 8,8 8,8 6,2 6,2 
1997 7,1 6,2 6,6 7,1 6,6 7,1 6,8 
1998 4,6 25,1 4,5 5,0 4,9 5,0 4,9 
1999 2,1 -13,9 2,2 5,4 5,5 4,5 4,6 
2000 1,4 78,2 1,0 3,0 2,7 4,3 4,1 
2001 2,1 -7,0 2,2 2,3 2,4 1,2 1,2 
2002 0,4 7,4 0,4 3,4 3,4 1,4 1,4 
2003 0,8 25,5 0,6 2,1 1,9 3,9 3,8 
2004 2,9 87,0 2,2 4,7 4,0 5,3 5,0 
2005 0,6 19,9 0,1 2,1 1,7 3,6 3,4 
2006 4,2 23,6 3,6 5,0 4,5 6,2 5,9 
2007 5,1 7,1 4,9 4,9 4,7 6,8 6,7 
2008 3,8 -17,6 4,3 5,7 6,2 5,1 5,4 
2009 3,5 -2,2 3,7 2,1 2,2 1,6 1,7 
2010 1,9 -10,9 2,2 3,2 3,5 3,9 4,0 
2011 0,5 -5,7 0,6 3,1 3,2 4,3 4,3 
        1995-2011 56,8 436,2 53,8 94,0 90,4 98,9 96,9 
Annual 
average 2,9 14,2 2,7 4,2 4,1 4,4 4,3 
Source: proprietary computations based on the CASE-Advisors macroeconomic model 
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The role of Western Union remittances  
 
Between 1994 and 2011, it is believed that the largest proportion of remittances was sent via 
Western Union – totalling some USD 5 billion in value, which (based on an average annual PLN/USD 
exchange rate) is equivalent to PLN 15.5 billion.   
 
Over our 16-year time span, this figure equates to around 10 per cent of the total value of foreign 
transfers to Poland (reported as real inflows). On a year-by-year basis, however, Western Union’s 
share of total transfers was quite volatile.  
 
From 1995 through to 2003, the Western Union share grew gradually and consistently from 1.5 per 
cent to 17.9 per cent. Following Poland’s accession to the European Union, other forms of 
remittance (including so-called ‘pocket transfers’ by individuals) immediately took a sizeable share, 
and continued to grow at an even faster pace. Consequently, the Western Union share of total 
remittances had fallen back to 8.1 per cent by 2008 – before climbing back to 10.6 per cent by 2011.  
 
Figure 9. Transfers via Western Union compared to total foreign transfer inflows, 1994-2011 
Transfers via Western Union 
Average 
annual FX 
rate 
USD PLN, million % of total PLN/USD 
1994 3 135 505 7,1 2,27 
1995 7 385 442 17,9 1,5 2,42 
1996 14 767 408 39,8 2,7 2,69 
1997 21 468 371 70,4 4,0 3,28 
1998 30 091 953 105,0 4,2 3,49 
1999 43 795 447 173,6 7,6 3,96 
2000 68 714 144 298,3 6,7 4,34 
2001 101 203 536 414,2 9,5 4,09 
2002 151 371 322 617,1 13,0 4,08 
2003 267 843 602 1 041,2 17,9 3,89 
2004 346 290 308 1 263,0 12,0 3,65 
2005 401 407 597 1 297,9 9,7 3,23 
2006 514 757 206 1 596,5 9,1 3,10 
2007 628 026 569 1 735,6 8,6 2,76 
2008 606 239 586 1 458,9 8,1 2,41 
2009 557 781 356 1 737,0 9,4 3,11 
2010 586 461 787 1 766,9 10,4 3,01 
2011 611 686 052 1 811,6 10,6 2,96 
1995-2011 15 444,8 9,6 
Source: proprietary computations based on data provided by Western Union 
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Remittances play a substantially important role  
 
Overall, we can clearly see that inward remittances from short-term and long-term migrant workers 
have been substantially important to the Polish economy.   
 
By modelling a “NO TRANSFERS” scenario we can see that, thanks to these remittances, GDP growth 
has been accelerated, average household income has been higher, and average household income 
has grown more quickly than would otherwise have been the case. 
 
Of course, across Poland’s large and sophisticated economy, it is important to keep the picture in 
perspective.  Since they equate to no more than 1.7 per cent of GDP, the macroeconomic impact of 
remittances has not been as spectacular as in some other countries (in which a larger proportion of 
the population choose to work overseas). 
 
It is, however, interesting to narrow our focus – and to consider the role that remittances have 
played within the particular regions and the type of households from which the highest proportions 
of migrant workers have been drawn. 
 
This is what we address in the final section of the paper. 
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Remittances in Poland – the impact on individual 
households 
 
For several years, Poland’s Central Statistical Office (GUS) has been researching typical household 
budgets through a periodic survey of 30,000 households. 
 
These surveys provide detailed findings on income, expenditure and living conditions, plus the socio-
demographic characteristics of all household members, their employment and the primary sources 
of income. In 2008, GUS took the opportunity to ask more specific questions in order to identify, for 
the first time, the size and the significance of income from overseas remittances. 
 
We used the findings as the basis for our statistical analysis.  And we sought to get some 
authoritative answers to a range of fundamental questions, such as: 
 
• How important are remittances to individual Polish households? 
• What types of household are the main beneficiaries of remittances? 
• To what extent, if any, have remittances contributed to the alleviation of poverty?  
• What role, if any, have remittances played in reducing income disparities? 
 
All of our source material is drawn from the 2008 household budget survey (it would, of course, have 
been preferable to use more recent data, but because remittance values have remained relatively 
constant since 2008, the findings should still be relevant).  In analysing the raw data, we have used 
the type of indicators that are most commonly applied to research on living standards. 
 
 
Identifying the sources of overseas income 
 
In the GUS annual household survey, detailed questions were asked about the scale and the nature 
of income from overseas.  This is classified across thirteen separate categories of income (such as 
income from family members generated through regular or ad hoc employment, income from self-
employment, income from the sale of goods or property and so on).   
 
Although it is not possible to say exactly how this income has been transferred to Poland (through 
formal remittances, for example, or directly from the migrant workers, or through some other 
means), it is clear that all of the money has come from overseas. 
 
In our analysis, we have taken the 13 categories and, for ease of reference, reduced them down to 
three main categories: 
 
1. Income from the employment and self-employment of household members 
2. Income from the social benefits of household members 
3. Income from non-household members (such as maintenance payments and other donations) 
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Income from property or other such sources is not reported separately, but is included in the grand 
total of all income. 
 
It is perhaps worth pointing out that, defined in such a way, the total value of overseas incomes is 
not totally consistent with the value of the transfers as reported in the national accounts. However, 
it seems appropriate to consider all overseas income and the impact on living standards, irrespective 
of whether it has all been captured within the macroeconomic statistics.  
 
 
The level of overseas income among individual families 
 
The GUS survey shows that income generated overseas is received by around 2.5 per cent of Polish 
households, which equates to some 330,000 households in total.  Given that these households will 
typically consist of several people, the actual number of beneficiaries goes up to 3.2 per cent of the 
population – or 1.2 million individuals.  
 
This figure may not seem overwhelmingly high, particularly given the common perception of Poland 
as a source of high numbers of migrant workers. However, the figure is broadly consistent with 
official estimates of the number of Polish nationals working overseas (some of whom maintain no 
economic ties with their families back home).  
 
Those households receiving funds from overseas, on average, receive some PLN 635.00 per head per 
month. Looked at in context, the figure is extremely high.  In fact it accounts, on average, for around 
62 per cent of total household income.  In other words, it supplements “domestic income” by 160 
per cent.  
 
In aggregate, the total value of overseas income reported within the GUS household budget survey 
comes to a grand total of PLN 9.1 billion to 9.4 billion – representing just over 0.7 per cent of 
Poland’s GDP.  When considering the economic impact among individual households, it is worth 
remembering that the figure is broadly comparable to Poland’s total Labour Fund (which reached 
PLN 11.2 billion in 2009), or to the value of the country’s Family Allowances (which exceeds PLN 8.1 
billion per annum). 
 
In terms of categories of income, by far the largest proportion comes from employment and self-
employment (accounting for 87 per cent of the total), followed by transfers from other households 
(at more than eight per cent). By comparison, other sources of income are insignificant.  
 
 
Who are the main beneficiaries of remittances? 
 
As indicated in the various figures below, the main characteristics of remittance recipients can be 
summarised as follows: 
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1. Recipients are most likely to live in small towns or rural areas, rather than in larger 
metropolitan areas. 
In larger urban centres (those with more than 500,000 inhabitants) an average of just 1.1 per 
cent of households receive remittances.  This compares to 3.1 per cent of households in towns 
of up to 20,000 inhabitants (that is, almost three times the share), and 2.8 per cent of 
households in rural areas)4. 
 
Recipients of transfers from non-household members tend to be more highly concentrated in 
medium-sized towns (between 100,000-200,000 inhabitants) – one per cent of households 
receive this type of transfer compared to 0.6 per cent of the population as a whole.  
 
   Figure 10.   Households receiving overseas income by location (%) 
 
Source: The 2008 Household Budget Survey 2008 and proprietary computations  
       - Income from employment  
- Transfers from other 
households 
- Total overseas income 
 City, 
population 
500 
thousand 
+  
City, 
populatio
n 200-
500 
thousand 
City, 
populatio
n 100-
200 
thousand 
Town 
Popula
tion 
20-100 
thousa
nd 
Town, 
popula
tion 
20thou
sand or 
less  
Rural 
areas  
 
 
 
2. As one would expect, recipients are most likely to live in those regions which account for the 
largest numbers of migrant workers 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, those households that are most likely to receive income from overseas 
tend to be located in these same regions.  The provinces (or vojvodships) which have been the 
source of the greatest numbers of migrant workers include: Podkarpackie, Świętokrzyskie, 
Podlaskie, Lubelskie, Małopolskie and Opolskie (given its particular ethnic structure5).  
                                                            
4
 It should be noted that these shares have not been significantly skewed by the relative sizes of the 
populations.  On aggregate, the populations of smaller towns and rural areas attract as much as 2.3 per cent of 
all inflowing incomes, whereas the larger metropolitan areas attract as little as 0.4 per cent 
5
 Ranking of regions by intensity of migration processes – cit. M. Okólski and I. Topińska (2011), “Social impact 
of emigration and rural-urban migration in Central and Eastern Europe. National Report: Poland; Project Paper 
VC/2010/0026 (unpublished)  
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The Opolskie region is the clear leader.  Here, as many as 6.2 per cent of all the households 
receive remittances.  Second comes the Pomorski region (4.4 per cent of households).  And third 
is the Podkarpackie region (4.2 per cent of households).  
 
Further down the list come Poland’s western border areas, such as the Lubuskie and Zachodnio-
Pomorskie regions. These may not generally be regarded as prime sources of emigration.  
However, their geographic location, close as it is to the national border, provides relatively easy 
access to overseas incomes.  
 
By contrast, the Podlaskie region (which may be regarded as a major source of migrant workers) 
is not ranked among the top beneficiary regions (1.86 per cent of households).  Meanwhile, the 
affluent parts of Central Poland (such as the Mazowieckie, Wielkopolskie, and Łódzkie regions) 
all appear towards the bottom of the listing.  
 
Figure 11. Percentage of households receiving overseas incomes by region 
  
 
3. Recipients tend to be larger households (predominantly working-age families with children), 
as opposed to smaller households (as populated by older people and single individuals).  
 
Demographic characteristics of households receiving overseas income are worthy of 
consideration. In particular, the size of the household and the presence of children within it are 
important factors. And, generally speaking, the larger the household, the more likely it will be to 
receive overseas income. 
  
Some 4.2 per cent of four-five member households receive overseas income.  Meanwhile, the 
corresponding figure for single individuals and childless couples stands as low as 1.0 per cent to 
1.1 per cent.   
 
Interestingly, more than three per cent of single parents receive remittances from non-
household members but a far lower proportion receive compensation for overseas employment 
(which, among the population as a whole, is the main source of overseas income). A possible 
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explanation could be that one of the parents has resided overseas for so long that they are no 
longer considered to be a household member. 
 
Figure 12. Access to overseas income by size of household (%) 
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Source: The 2008 Household Budget Survey and proprietary computations  
 
Another interesting – and linked – demographic factor is the age of family members within a 
household.  The GUS household budget survey reveals that it is younger families who are the 
most likely to receive overseas income.  For families in which the head of the household is less 
than 40 years, the proportion in receipt of overseas income stands at 3.5 per cent.  This figure 
progressively reduces through the age groups, and stands at around 1.0 per cent for those in 
which the head of the household is beyond retirement age. 
 
The same pattern is generally repeated for all categories of overseas income (for example, for 
remittances from non-household members).  This could suggest that it is uncommon for Polish 
migrant workers to be supporting elderly parents or relatives.  
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Figure 13. Households with access to overseas incomes by age of the householder/family 
head (%) 
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Source: The 2008 Household Budget Survey and proprietary computations  
 
4. Household members tend to be educated to lower-secondary standards or to have vocational 
qualifications, as opposed to secondary or tertiary-level qualifications 
 
There is also a marked correlation between a beneficiary’s education level and the receipt of 
overseas income.  The vast majority of beneficiaries are educated to lower-secondary level or 
have a vocational qualification (3.5 per cent of such households receive overseas income). 
 
This figure is commensurate with the high levels of emigration among semi-skilled Polish 
workers and craftsmen, who typically take up overseas jobs in the construction sector or in 
related areas of work (such as mechanical servicing and repairs). 
 
 
The role played in reducing poverty and alleviating income disparities 
   
Intuitively, one can reach the conclusion that income from overseas should play a role in reducing 
poverty and alleviating income disparity.  But, if there truly is such an impact, what is its true extent? 
 
To answer this question, it is useful to compare the financial standing and behaviour of two distinct 
populations – namely, those households that do receive overseas income, and those that exist on 
domestic means alone. 
 
The GUS household budget survey suggests that, in terms of disposable income, there is hardly any 
difference between the two types of household:  those who receive overseas income have a 
monthly disposable income of PLN 1,056, whereas those who do not have PLN 1,045. 
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However, the picture changes when we look at the specific income components of the two 
respective groups.  This reveals that those households with access to funds from overseas derive 
three quarters of their income from employment and as little as ten per cent from social benefits 
(such as social insurance payments, disability payments and pensions).  By contrast, those 
households with no access to funds from overseas derive one quarter of their income from social 
benefits, and as little as 60 per cent from employment.  However, this income structure reflects the 
fact that those households with overseas income tend to be younger and more active in the labour 
market. 
 
In terms of average expenditure, significant differences also become apparent.  Those households 
with overseas income have markedly lower levels of monthly expenditure.  This is true on a per 
capita basis (PLN 815 and PLN 907 respectively) and also an equivalent spending basis (PLN 1,360 
and PLN 1,391).  Once again, this may reflect the lower age groups of these families.  It may also 
reflect a higher propensity to save. 
 
Looking at respective poverty rates, the GUS survey also reveals an interesting picture.  We can 
ascertain this rate by analysing the equivalent levels of spending of each group, and then setting the 
poverty line at 50 per cent of average spending (that is, PLN 706 per month).  Based on this 
calculation, the respective poverty rates stands at 17.1 per cent for households with no overseas 
income, and 16.2 per cent for families that do have access to such income.   
 
This overall, aggregated calculation gives us the first indication that remittances do help to reduce 
poverty and to alleviate income disparities.  By going down to another level of analysis, and 
considering the impact among different income groups (by investigating so-called quintile groups 
and Gini coefficients), we can get a clearer understanding of its true extent and nature.  
 
• For the poorest households (the first quintile group comprising the 20 per cent of individuals 
with lowest equivalent spending), the receipt of overseas income can account for 61 per cent of 
total disposable income. 
 
• For the moderately affluent households (the second, third and fourth quintile groups, 
representing the next 60 per cent of the population), the equivalent figure ranges between 62 
per cent and 64 per cent.    
 
• For the most affluent households (the fifth quintile group and the 20 per cent of individuals with 
the highest equivalent spending), the figure stands at 60 per cent. 
 
On this basis, all of the households, irrespective of their level of affluence, would certainly “feel” a 
comparatively powerful impact from the overseas funds they receive.  Also, interdependences 
between income and compensation received for work overseas were found to be quite similar, while 
just the opposite was true about income and compensation for domestic employment.     
 
When the total income pool from overseas funds is distributed among the respective quintile groups 
yet more clarity emerges.  Under this analysis, the least affluent households receive more in 
overseas income than in total disposable income, while the most affluent ones receive relatively less 
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(although the discrepancies are not actually that high).  For example, the second quintile group gets 
14 per cent of all disposable income, 18 per cent of all overseas income and 20 per cent of all income 
from employment oversees.  By contrast, the fifth quintile receives 35 per cent, 32 per cent, and 31 
per cent respectively.  This indicates the balancing effect of the foreign incomes, which (though not 
that strong) is still capable of reducing inequalities.    
 
Figure 14. Distribution of global income by quintile group 
 
Note: Quintile groups comprise individuals categorised by equivalent spending levels 
Source: The 2008 Household Budget survey and proprietary computations  
 
The so-called Gini coefficient is a widely adopted method of assessing relative income inequalities.  It 
is therefore useful for us to use here as an additional frame of reference. 
 
Using this system, income inequality is measured on a scale from 0 to 1 (where 0 represents 
complete inequality and 1 represents complete equality).  When total disposable incomes are 
computed (exclusive of all overseas income) using the GUS survey findings, the indices for all families 
range from 0.34 to 0.35 – indicating the presence of moderate inequalities. 
 
When foreign incomes are included in the calculation, the indices fall by 0.01.  This implies a slight 
reduction in income disparities, which is attributable to overseas income.  This effect is valid, not 
only for the total household population, but also for the city-level populations and, to a slightly 
lesser extent, the rural populations. 
 
This conclusion is also supported by a further stage of analysis, in which we identified the effect of 
employment income on the levels of inequality in overall income distribution.  In this analysis, we 
chose to focus purely on income from overseas employment (due to their comparative weighting 
and the fact that, unlike transfers from non-household members, they tend to constitute a 
fundamental component of household incomes).  Again, we used Gini coefficients, this time 
supplemented by additional concentration indices (relating to income from employment and its 
contribution to disposable income). 
 
Using this methodology, we are able to understand the way in which movements in different income 
components affects disparities in total incomes.  And we concluded that a 1.0 per cent increase in 
income from overseas employment leads directly to a small, but clearly discernible, decline in 
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income inequalities (measured with the Gini coefficient, this decline equates to 0.006).  Incidentally, 
an opposite and much stronger impact occurs for incomes from domestic employment. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to dig deeper into the effects of overseas income on poverty rates. 
 
Again, we define the poverty rates as the proportion of those households whose income falls below 
50 per cent of the average equivalent spending level.  This calculation was made for all households 
taken together.  We also identified a range of specific household categories (such as rural dwellers, 
city dwellers, specific types of household, and various age groups). 
 
Here, our hypothetical poverty rate (assuming no overseas income) would stand at 19 per cent for 
all households.  However, the actual poverty rate (including overseas income) equates to 17 per 
cent. 
 
It follows, therefore, that overseas income are responsible for a two per centage point decrease in 
Poland’s national poverty rates.  The fall is deeper for rural inhabitants (2.1 per centage points) than 
for city-dwellers (1.8 per centage points), and is particularly visible in smaller towns.  The main 
beneficiaries tend to be larger, younger families.  But the effect on single individuals, on the elderly 
and on childless couples tends to be quite meagre. 
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Our overall conclusions 
 
Over recent years, the positive impact of overseas remittances on emerging economies has been the 
subject of considerable debate.  Again, these remittances are often referred to as the ‘third pillar’ of 
development (alongside foreign direct investment and overseas development assistance).  And their 
value has outweighed the value of official development assistance. 
 
Against this background it is interesting (and important) to conduct an in-depth analysis of the true 
impact – particularly for a country such as Poland, which has a reputation as a significant “exporter” 
of migrant workers and, by implication, a significant beneficiary of overseas remittances. 
 
Through this analysis we can conclude that, yes, remittances have a clear and positive impact on 
Poland’s economic well-being: 
 
• At the macroeconomic level – they do increase disposable incomes and consumer expenditure 
and accelerate GDP growth 
 
• At the household level – they do alleviate poverty and reduce income disparities 
 
However, the extent of these impacts should be kept in perspective.  Although they are clearly 
visible, they tend not to be that strong.  They are also quite selective – in that they clearly favour 
certain demographic groups and geographic locations. 
 
One should also exercise real caution when extrapolating these findings to other economies.  They 
are indicative of the true sophistication of the Polish economy, its true scale as an exporter of 
migrant workers (not to mention their particular behaviours, family ties and responsibilities). 
 
Having said this, one can safely conclude that remittances do have a positive impact on domestic 
economies.  But the actual extent of that impact will be determined by the value of the remittances 
combined with a wide range of other variables.  
 
 
